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Summary
While a very active debate continues over whether military force should be used
against Iraq, military contingency planning is underway.  This report focuses
primarily on these contingency preparations, notably potential military options
available and the military preparations that have been undertaken. It addresses
elements of the over-arching political debate only when immediately relevant to
military planning.  (For further information, see CRS Report RS21325, Iraq:
Divergent Views on U.S. Military Action) Iraq’s chemical, biological, and nuclear
weapons programs, together with long-range missile development, and alleged
support for terrorism are the justifications put forward for military action.  Though
initial emphasis was on the ouster of Saddam Hussein, the Administration has more
recently pointed to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) disarmament as its prime
objective.  The report of the U.N. arms inspectors, due January 27 to the United
Nations Security Council, is being viewed as a key element in any decision to initiate
military action.
News reports have indicated that the military options under discussion varied
in their assumptions about Iraqi military capabilities, the usefulness of Iraqi
opposition groups, the attitude of regional governments, and the U.S. resources that
would be required. A “heavy” option would involve 250,000 troops (ashore and
afloat), and would combine an air offensive with four or more armored and
mechanized divisions.  This option is dependent upon the cooperation of regional
nations for staging areas/airbases and could require months to deploy the necessary
forces.  A “lite” option would entail extensive use of special operations forces in
cooperation with indigenous Iraqi opposition forces, coupled with an intense air
offensive to destroy Hussein’s most reliable Republican Guard units, command &
control centers, and WMD capabilities.  This approach assumes that the regular Iraqi
army will prove unreliable, once it is clear that defeat is imminent. Both “heavy” and
“lite” options were reportedly set aside in the Fall of 2002, and news reports began
to indicate that the plan of choice was a blend of the two.  Involving perhaps100,000
+U.S. personnel, this option appears to focus upon the diversity of units attacking
(armor, airmobile, special operations), and close coordination of air and ground
attacks.  Indigenous forces would not play a large role, though some effort would be
made to gain their cooperation. Though these elements appear to remain at the core
of DOD’s planning, early 2003 press reports began to indicate that force strengths
closer to the “heavy” option would  be deployed.
Key arrangements for the use of regional military facilities are reportedly  in
place with Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman.  Negotiations continue with Saudi
Arabia and Turkey.  The extent  of cooperation may, however, depend heavily upon
the results of the UN arms inspections and Security Council action. The United
Kingdom and Australia remain the only nations committed to contribute forces.
Though costs remain very difficult to predict, several estimate have been put forward,
ranging from $50 billion to $1.2 trillion depending on the factors included (e.g.,
occupation costs, economic consequences). 
This report will be updated as events warrant.
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Iraq: Potential Military Options
Background
Iraq’s chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs, together with Iraqi
long-range missile development, and support for terrorism are the primary
justifications put forward by the Bush Administration for military action.  Although
the Administration has voiced strong skepticism of efforts to resume United Nations
weapons inspection in Iraq, it negotiated the drafting and passage of U.N. Security
Council Resolution 1441, which returned inspectors to Iraq.  The resolution requires
the inspectors to provide an initial  report on their findings by January 27, 2003. 1
Since Iraq ended cooperation with U.N. inspectors in 1998, there has been little
information on the state of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) arsenal,
however Administration officials are convinced that Iraq has reconstituted significant
capabilities. Initially, leading Administration officials, most notably Vice-President
Cheney, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, and his Deputy Paul Wolfowitz, stressed that
“regime change” or the removal of Saddam Hussein from power by force, was the
only way to eliminate the threat of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.2   Later in
2002, WMD disarmament was emphasized as the primary objective.  Expanding on
this theme, President Bush, in his speech before the United Nations on August 12,
specified  the following conditions that the Administration believes Iraq must meet
to forestall military action against it:
! Immediately and unconditionally forswear, disclose, and remove or destroy
all weapons of mass destruction, long-range missiles, and all related material.
! End all support for terrorism and act to suppress it.
! Cease persecution of its civilian population.
! Release or account for all Gulf War missing personnel.
! End all illicit trade outside the oil-for-food program and allow United Nations
administration of its funds.3
   While a very active debate continues over whether military force should be
used against Iraq, military contingency planning is underway.  This report focuses
primarily on these contingency preparations, notably potential military options
available and the military preparations that have been undertaken. It addresses
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elements of the over-arching political debate only when immediately relevant to
military planning.
Military Options Considered
The Department of Defense has officially released little  information concerning
war planning or preparations against Iraq.  There have been, however, frequent and
significant news leaks which provide a range of details.  News reports have indicated
that the military  options that have been under discussion varied significantly in their
assumptions regarding Iraq military capabilities today, the usefulness of Iraqi
opposition groups, the attitude of regional governments, and the U.S. military
resources that would be required.
Large-Scale Invasion
This option, often called the “Franks Plan”, after Army Gen. Tommy Franks, the
U.S. Central Command commander who first briefed it to the President and White
House Staff calls for a large-scale ground force invasion.  Reportedly, this option
would involve 250,000 troops, and would combine an air offensive with up to four
armored, mechanized, and/or Marine divisions.  In essence, it would be a smaller
version of the 1991 Desert Storm operation, with the smaller force reflecting an
assessment that Iraqi armed forces are neither as numerous nor as capable as they
were ten years ago, and that U.S. forces are significantly more capable.  This option
is greatly dependent upon the cooperation of regional nations for substantial staging
areas/airbases and could require months to deploy the necessary forces.  It is
generally considered to offer the greatest certainty for a rapid victory against even
significant Iraqi resistance, and is in keeping with the so-called “Powell Doctrine’s”
concept of overwhelming force. It also would result in substantial forces in place to
maintain the occupation of Iraq until such time as a new government was
established.4
News reports indicated, however, that this “heavy” approach did not receive the
support of the DOD civilian leadership or White House advisors.  Questions over the
reliability of the regional support that would be necessary for staging areas and the
length of time required for deployment were the major concerns.5
Special Operations/Indigenous Forces
This option involved the smallest number of U.S. ground troops.  It was
reportedly put forward by Army General Wayne Downing (Ret.), then an anti-
terrorism advisor on the National Security Council.  It would entail extensive use of
special operations forces in cooperation with indigenous Iraqi opposition forces,
coupled with an extensive air offensive to destroy Hussein’s most reliable
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Republican Guard units, command & control centers, and WMD capabilities.  This
approach assumed that the regular Iraqi army would prove unreliable, and could
even join opposition forces once it is clear that defeat is imminent. To encourage this,
significant emphasis would be placed on an intensive psychological warfare or
“psyops” campaign to undermine the morale of Iraqi soldiers and unit commanders,
persuading them of the hopelessness of resistance.  This approach was used
effectively in Afghanistan against the Taliban government forces, when special
operations forces teamed with existing Northern Alliance opposition military units
to both guide and exploit U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy air attacks.6
While having the advantage of not requiring large staging areas (though some
regional air basing would be required) or months to prepare, this is generally
considered the riskiest approach.  The weakness of Iraqi opposition military forces
and their competing political agendas place their effectiveness in question, and
predicting the behavior of regular Iraqi Army units under attack is problematic.  This
option also does not address the possibility of stiff resistance by Republican Guard
units in the environs of Baghdad, nor the troop requirements of a post-conflict
occupation.  Consequently, it is reportedly no longer under active consideration by
the Bush Administration.
The “Middle” Option
Current news reports indicate that the Administration’s plan of choice appears
to be a blend of the two options.  Involving at least  100,000 U.S.  troops (ashore and
afloat), this option appears to focus not on the size of the U.S. force, but rather upon
the diversity of units attacking (armor, airmobile, special operations, marine), and
very close coordination of air and ground attacks.  Indigenous forces would not
necessarily play a large role, though some effort would be made through Central
Intelligence Agency teams and special operations units to gain their cooperation.
Particular efforts may be made to isolate and neutralize key Iraqi leadership.
Targeting would still emphasize command & control centers, WMD capabilities,
Saddam Hussein’s palace complexes, and Republican Guard units. Again “psyops”
would be carried out to persuade regular Iraqi army units that resistance would be
futile. There would be very heavy reliance  upon air power, particularly in the initial
phase.  This would require some region al basing for Air Force tactical aircraft and
aerial-refueling tankers, in addition to greater reliance upon strategic bombers and
Navy cruise missiles and carrier aircraft. Armor/mechanized ground forces would
move in from Kuwait in the south, and airmobile forces possibly from Turkey in the
north. Airborne and helicopter air assault troops may be used to seize  high-value
targets deep within Iraq, and there has also been discussion of a seaborne assault by
the U.S. Marine Corps from the Persian Gulf as an integral element of this option.7
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Factors for Consideration
Roles and Attitudes of Other Nations
It appears that,  unless there are major shifts in the international political scene,
U.S. military action against Iraq will not be in the context of a large coalition similar
to that formed for Desert Storm in 1991. To date, only the United Kingdom and
Australia have offered their  armed forces’ participation.  In 1991, 28 nations
contributed military units.  Also, the cooperation of Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the
Gulf States provided extensive staging and transportation facilities, and  multiple
fronts from which to launch attacks. Egypt, a 1991 coalition member,  expedited
passage of naval forces and transport shipping through the Suez Canal.  Aside from
their military force contributions, European allies also permitted use of U.S. airbases
in their countries and granted overflight rights.  Though some European allies
(notably France and Germany) appear to be less opposed to military action than
previously, the extent and conditions of possible assistance remain unclear.
Depending upon how international events play out – particularly the report of U.N.
arms inspectors and the actions of the U.N. Security Council, this type of cooperation
may or may not be available. 
Considerations such as these, particularly in a fluctuating international political
environment, confront military planners with complex challenges. It has been
suggested that some nations’  public opposition to military action against Iraq does
not reflect the nature of “private” diplomatic conversations which indicate a greater
willingness to support U.S. policy.  If true, this could result in unacknowledged or
covert assistance, or perhaps overt cooperation after an attack has begun and a U.S.
victory appears assured.
Saudi Arabia, a previous opponent of  military action, has now expressed some
willingness to permit the United States use of its facilities, upon condition of a
United Nations resolution authorizing the use of military force against Iraq.  Saudi
cooperation would provide a very significant boon to military planners, though there
may be some concern over what role in military decision-making the Saudi
government would play once an operation is underway.8
Knowing that U.S. facilities in Saudi Arabia may not be available for operations
against Iraq, the United States has been establishing defense agreements, and
expanding or upgrading airbase and logistics facilities in Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman,
Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates – countries whose support of U.S. policy in the
region is judged the most reliable.9 Each of these countries has permitted use of
airbases to support U.S. military operations in Afghanistan, while Saudi Arabia
allowed only the use of the air operations command center on its territory.  Given the
range of facilities and prepositioned U.S. equipment in these countries, their
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cooperation would be crucial to a military offensive against Iraq.  As with the
European allies, the extent of cooperation from these nations will probably great
depend upon the results of U.N. arms inspections and the actions of the U.N. Security
Council.  If they insist upon a second U.N. resolution specifically authorizing military
action against Iraq as a condition for their full cooperation, there are concerns that
this could delay operation beyond April, which is considered the  latest date to avoid
having to conduct desert operations in the heat of the Iraqi summer.
 The United States and Bahrain have a defense cooperation agreement regarding
prepositioning war materiel.  The U.S. Navy 5th Fleet headquarters is in Bahrain, and
the Air Force currently has use of Bahrain’s Shaikh airbase.  Since the Gulf War, the
United States has maintained a presence of 4,000-6,000 troops in Kuwait, rotating
ground force units in and out  on training exercises, and has pre-positioned at least
a brigade’s equipment. Construction is nearly complete on a new, expanded U.S.
staging facility.  Recent press reports indicate that the U.S. troop level has increased
to over 10,000.  The U.S. Air Force has use of two Kuwaiti airfields – Ali al Salem
and Ali al-Jabiru.  In Oman, through a cooperative agreement, the Air Force has
access to four airbases – al-Musnanah, Masirah, Seeb, and Thumrait – which it has
been upgrading to handle a full range of air operations.  Qatar has developed a very
close cooperative defense relationship with the United States, permitting the
prepositioning of enough equipment for three U.S. Army brigades and the
construction of an operations command center at al-Udaid airbase comparable to that
located at Prince Sultan airbase in Saudi Arabia.  This facility has been extensively
used to support operations in Afghanistan, and 600 personnel from Central
Command Headquarters deployed there in mid-September, 2002.  DOD described
this deployment as a training exercise, though most believe it to be connected to
preparations for an Iraq offensive.  In the United Arab Emirates, the U.S. Navy has
access to port facilities and the Air Force is using the al-Dhafra airbase. 10
The attitude of the Turkish government towards U.S. military action against Iraq
is a very important consideration for U.S. military planners.  Currently, the U.S. Air
Force is carrying out the “no-fly zone” enforcement operation Northern Watch from
Incirlik airbase in Turkey under a detailed agreement which limits flights and the
number of U.S. aircraft that can be stationed there.  There have also been press
reports that Turkey has facilitated U.S. upgrading of airfields located inside northern
Iraq.  After a significant delay, Turkey has now allowed a U.S. Air Force survey team
to begin evaluating additional airfields inside Turkey. Aside from permitting air
operations from Incirlik, Turkish cooperation could also provide a northern front for
U.S. ground operations.  Though very difficult, mountainous terrain presents
challenges in this area, if the United States intends to coopt the indigenous Kurdish
opposition forces as part of its attack strategy, access to northern Iraq through
Turkish territory would be crucial.  Complicating this issue are Turkish concerns
about Kurdish opposition groups’ desires for autonomy which could encourage Kurd
separatist groups in western Turkey, and the Iraqi Kurds’ objections to any increase
in the number of Turkish troops in their region.  Press reports have indicated that
airmobile operations out of Turkish airbases are being considered, with units such as
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the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) “hopscotching” through en route to Iraq.
This approach could alleviate the Turkish concern about a large U.S. troop presence
in Turkey, and avoid the geographical bottleneck posed by the mountainous terrain
on the Iraq-Turkish border.  With press reports varying from day to  day, it still
remains to be seen whether the Turkish government will eventually endorse a
northern ground offensive.
Improved U.S. Military Technology
Significant technological advancements, particularly in precision-guided
munitions, have led DOD spokesmen to emphasize that an air campaign against Iraq
would be considerably more efficient and more militarily devastating than Operation
Desert Storm.  In 1991 only ten percent of the aerial munitions used were precision-
guided.  That ratio could well be the inverse in an air campaign today.  This would
allow a greater number of targets to be destroyed far more rapidly, using fewer
aircraft and with less chance of collateral damage.  U.S. military planners have paid
particular attention to the problem of Iraqi SCUD missiles.  In 1991, the allied
coalition was unable to locate and destroy any SCUD mobile launchers, and U.S.
intelligence believes that Iraq still possesses at least 24 missiles, some possibly armed
with chemical or biological warheads.  Using new equipment, such as the Tactical
Airborne Warning System (TAWS) and the PAC-3 air defense missiles,  DOD hopes
to be able to greatly reduce the time from missile launch detection to intercept,
improving the chance of both destroying the launched missile and the missile
launcher. Improvements in satellite reconnaissance, communications, and unmanned
aerial vehicles now available to ground commanders are also seen as major advances
over Desert Storm capabilities.
The greater availability of precision-guided munitions (PGMs) bodes well for
attacks against stationary targets, and moving targets in open terrain.  There have
been some question raised about the level of PGM inventories after the Afghanistan
campaign, but DOD has insisted they remain adequate for operations against Iraq.11
Military operations in an urban environment would ,however, limit the effectiveness
of air power and armor units. Timely targeting information, rules of target
engagement, and avoidance of “friendly fire” casualties will remain prime concerns.
There is also, of course, the separate issue of the distinctive requirements of
“building-to-building” urban warfare.
Cyberwarfare is an area where U.S. technology could be brought to bear, but
still has unresolved policy issues.  DOD is recommending penetration of Iraqi
computer networks to degrade communications and air defense capabilities, however
the inter-agency policy group that must approve military attacks against computer
networks has yet to grant such authority.12
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Iraqi Military Capabilities
Conventional Forces.  There is little disagreement that Iraqi armed forces
are significantly degraded from their condition during the Persian Gulf War in 1991.
Manpower stands at roughly 50% or less of its 1991 level or about 350,000-400,000.
Unclassified estimates put equipment levels at about 2,000-2,600 tanks, 3,700
armored vehicles, and 300 combat aircraft.13  A number of factors are believed to
hamper Iraqi military effectiveness.  A decade of arms embargo has resulted in much
equipment now being obsolete or inoperable.  Many of Iraq’s regular army divisions
are undermanned and all comprise mostly conscripts.  Large unit and combined arms
training is lacking, and combat experienced non-commissioned officers and
commanders are relatively few.  Logistical support is not robust, and is vulnerable
to air interdiction. 
Saddam Hussein’s fear of internal coups has served to make regime security a
paramount concern, which could have a detrimental effect on Iraq’s military
effectiveness.  The best equipped and most reliable troops, the Republican Guard,
are kept near Baghdad for regime protection.  The officer corps is subject to intense
scrutiny for loyalty and subject to unpredictable purges.  The distribution of
weaponry and supplies is curtailed among regular army units to forestall attempts to
overthrow the regime.  There also exist tensions, to some extent purposely
encouraged, between regular and Republican Guard units, which could hamper
coordination.14
These considerations notwithstanding, the Iraqi military still presents some
significant challenges for U.S. military planners.  One area where Iraq has reportedly
been able to enhance its capabilities in the last decade is air defense.  Smuggled
equipment has enabled an improved command and control system.  “Lessons
learned” from both the Gulf War and from experience with the U.S. overflight
operations in northern and southern Iraq may have improved Iraqi abilities in this
area. Given that  any U.S. military offensive operation will depend heavily upon
“control of the skies”, U.S. planners must ensure that Iraqi air defenses are
neutralized early.  Press reports have noted that U.S. and British pilots in the
overflight Operation Southern Watch have recently stepped up attacks on Iraqi air
defense sites.  DOD maintains that these attacks have been solely in response to
hostile fire, though some have speculated that they represent a “softening up” of
Iraq’s southern air defenses.15
It cannot be assumed that a ground campaign would be simply a replay of 1991's
Operation Desert Storm. After that experience when Iraqi units deployed in the open
desert were subjected to devastating air attacks, Iraq’s military leadership may choose
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an urban strategy to reduce the effectiveness of U.S. airpower.  By choosing to
defend only urban centers, Iraq would force the United States to commit troops to
urban combat – one of the most difficult types to conduct – and simultaneously
constrain U.S. Air Force targeting because of concerns over collateral damage and
casualties.  The Iraqi government has shown no hesitation to locate military facilities
in civilian areas to exploit this concern.  Republican Guard units in the environs of
Baghdad, as part of their regime protection mission, have trained for urban combat,
and could provide significant resistance mingled with Baghdad’s population of 4
million.  There have been reports of underground tunnel systems in urban centers
specifically designed to facilitate urban defense.16
Chemical and Biological Weapons. Though not yet judged to have
developed a nuclear weapons capability, Iraq is believed to have probably retained
chemical and biological (CB) stockpiles from before the Persian Gulf War, and may
have continued covert CB development and/or production since.  Some CB facilities
that were destroyed during the Persian Gulf War reportedly have been re-built.  Iraq
is known to have produced blister agents (“mustard gas”) and both persistent and
non-persistent nerve agents (VX and Sarin). Biological agents produced include
anthrax, aflatoxin, and the toxin agents botulinum and ricin.  Though unconfirmed,
it is possible that Iraq may also possess the smallpox virus cultured from natural
outbreaks of the disease in Iraq prior to its world-wide eradication in the early 1970s.
Iraq is known  to have developed a variety of means to disseminate CB weapons,
including bombs, artillery shells, missile warheads, mines,  and aerial sprayers for
both manned and unmanned aircraft.  There have been some questions about the
effectiveness of these delivery systems, but they remain unanswered. 17
Though Iraq did not use CB weapons in the Persian Gulf War, many believe that
Saddam Hussein’s restraint in this regard will be not repeated.  This view is based on
the assumption that, given that the U.S. objective would now be the destruction of
his regime rather than the more limited objectives in the Persian Gulf War, Hussein
would have “nothing to lose” by their employment.  The actual use of these weapons
will rest ultimately, however, upon the military commanders who control them, and
U.S. planners are focusing on ways to persuade these officers that using CB weapons
would be suicidal.  In addition, known CB weapons sites will likely be very early
targets regardless of which invasion strategy is chosen.  In attacking CB facilities –
particularly those with substantial amounts of munitions – military planners will have
to consider the possible effects on U.S. personnel and Iraqi civilians of the
inadvertent release of CB agents.
Given that Iraqi employment of CB weapons remains an open question, U.S.
forces must be prepared to operate in a CB contaminated environment.  Though
perhaps better prepared than any other military to deal with CB warfare, U.S. forces
have not actually encountered the use of CB weapons since World War I.  U.S.
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planners will have to ensure that there are adequate supplies of protective and
decontamination equipment for an invasion force, and will again be confronted with
the problematic issue of vaccinations and prophylactic pharmaceuticals that has led
to the “Gulf War illnesses” controversy.  Indicative of this latter problem, even though
production of anthrax vaccine has been restored, DOD has still not re-instated its
service-wide vaccination policy. This concern may be compounded with the smallpox
vaccine.  In October 2002, the General Accounting Office reiterated its concerns over
“serious problems” in the adequacy of the armed forces CBW training, availability of
specialist personnel, and defensive equipment inventories 18
One of the unique qualities of CB weapons is that the employment of even a
small number or amount can have an effect significantly out of proportion to the
casualties actually inflicted.  Trace amounts will force military units to “suit up” and
can severely degrade their performance. Logistics facilities (e.g. ports), often staffed
by unprotected civilians, could be shut down by relatively small amounts of
persistent nerve agent because the workforce refuses to return.  Civilian ships
chartered for military transport are particularly vulnerable to threats of chemical or
biological attacks and, as occurred in the Persian Gulf War, civilian crews may refuse
to enter the war zone.  In short, the psychological effects of these weapons could
prove just  as disruptive as their physical effects.
Another concern is the possibility of Iraq employing biological or toxin agents
as retaliatory terror weapons against the populations of cooperating countries, Israel,
or the United States itself.  The spread of a contagious disease such as smallpox
could be the most devastating to civilian populations, though if used regionally,  the
use of a contagious disease would run the risk of its re-introduction into the Iraqi
population.
The Bush Administration’s announced policy of possible nuclear retaliation if
WMD are used against U.S. forces may serve as a deterrent, as more veiled
references to nuclear force were felt to forestall their use in 1991.19  On the other
hand, the U.S. emphasis upon ousting Hussein could induce a “nothing to lose”
attitude conducive to using CB weapons.
Post-War Requirements
In testimony before the House Armed Services Committee on September 18,
Defense Secretary Rumsfeld declined to speculate upon what might be the military
requirements for the United States in post-war Iraq, assuming Saddam Hussein’s
ouster.  This reflects the great difficulty in predicting what the political and military
situation would be in a post-war Iraq, and how long a U.S. military presence would
be required before an acceptable and stable Iraqi government could be established.
The reaction of the Iraq population is the key element, and will depend upon a variety
of factors, such as the nature and extent of war damage and casualties, the demands
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of ethnic and religious minorities, and the speed with which a credible government
can be established.  Though a short-term post-war occupation may be a possibility,
it is likely that a continued deployment of substantial military ground force will be
necessary for several years.  For comparison, in the relatively benign environment
and considerably smaller areas of Bosnia and Kosovo, NATO currently maintains a
deployment of about 60,000 troops.  It is possible, however, that some nations
unwilling to participate in military action against Iraq may be willing to contribute
to a post-war stabilization force, thus alleviating some of the burden on U.S. forces.
Other U.S. Military Resource Requirements
Aside from the deployments in the Balkans where the United States has about
12,000 troops, operations continue in Afghanistan where U.S. troops number about
7,000.  DOD has not released information on the current deployment situation for
U.S. Air Force units: however many air assets could possibly respond to operational
requirements for either Iraq or Afghanistan from their current bases, if aerial re-
fueling is possible.  While the Department of Defense could meet the overall
manpower requirements of an Iraqi invasion, an issue of particular concern is
whether sufficient “low density-high demand” assets can be made available.  These
include assets such as the EA-6B aircraft used to engage air defense radars, the
AWACS and JSTARS reconnaissance/air control aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles,
Combat-Air-Search  and rescue (CSAR), and all special operations forces (SOF).
Demands on special operations forces have been particularly high  over the last year.
Most notably in Afghanistan, but there have also been training/advisory missions in
the Philippines, Georgia (Graze),  and Yemen as part of a world-wide antiterrorism
campaign, in addition to anti-drug operations in Columbia.  And, recently Secretary
Rumsfeld indicated that he intended to increase further the SOF commitment to the
war on terrorism .20 It is in this context, that some have suggested that an invasion of
Iraq would detract from the resources available to continue efforts to pursue the
world-wide war on terrorism, which they view as currently a greater threat to U.S.
security than Iraq.21
North Korea’s decision in December 2002 to resume its nuclear weapons
program has raised tensions in that region, and brought attention to the question
whether the United States would and/or could take military action there, in addition
to a campaign in Iraq.  Secretary Rumsfeld has asserted that U.S. military resources
are sufficient to fight in two theaters simultaneously, though some observers have
strongly disagreed, citing shortages of strategic air/sealift and active duty personnel.22
At a  minimum, the situation on the Korean Peninsula may mean that Pacific
Command forces that may have otherwise deployed to the Persian Gulf will have to
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remain in the Pacific region. Meanwhile, the Bush Administration has stressed it is
seeking a diplomatic rather than military resolution to the North Korean situation.
Costs
Predicting the cost of military operations is a task that DOD did not undertake
prior to the peace-keeping deployments to the Balkans, and remains a highly
conjectural exercise.  Methodologies tend to be relatively crude and based upon
historical experience, i.e. “the last war”.  Secretary Rumsfeld has expressed his
opinion that “it is unknowable what a war or conflict like that would cost.”23
Nevertheless, some estimates have appeared.  Michael O’Hanlon of the
Brookings Institution, has pegged a 250,000-strong invasion at between $40-$50
billion with a follow-up occupation costing $10-$20 billion a year.  Former White
House economic advisor Lawrence Lindsay has estimated the high limit on the cost
to be 1-2% of GNP, or about $100-$200 billion. Mitch Daniels, Director of the
Office of Management and Budget subsequently discounted this estimate as “very,
very high”, and has stated that the costs would be between$50-$60 billion, though no
specific supporting figures were provided for the estimate.24    In response to a
request from Senator Conrad and Representative Spratt, members of the Budget
Committees of their respective chambers, the Congressional Budget Office prepared
a cost estimate with supporting documentation that divided the costs into three
segments: force deployment –  $9 to $13 billion; combat operations – $6 to $9 billion
per month; and post-conflict occupation – $1 to $4 billion a month.  This CBO
estimate includes only “incremental” costs, i.e. those over and above DOD’s normal
operations and maintenance costs.25 The American Academy of Arts and Sciences
has published a more wide-ranging report which covers the possibility of an extended
occupation, in addition to potential long-term economic consequences and concludes
that potential costs could range from $99 billion to $1.2 trillion.26  For comparison,
the cost to the United States of the Persian Gulf War in 1990-91 was approximately
$60 billion, and almost all of this cost was offset by international financial
contributions.
